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ABSTRACT 
 U.S. Navy helicopters emerged as an innovative concept during World War II and 
have been a major component of naval aviation for over 70 years. Despite consistent 
support and a surge of resources at the turn of the 21st century, new concepts—such as 
the “Carrier Air Wing of the Future,” which reduces the helicopter footprint within the 
carrier air wing by over 30 percent—appear to signal that the Navy is moving on from 
helicopters. What explains the U.S. Navy’s apparent deemphasis of the helicopter 
community?  This thesis addresses and seeks to explain this apparent deemphasis by 
analyzing the Navy helicopter community through five models of military innovation 
studies. Ultimately, this thesis finds that no single model provides a sufficient 
explanation. Instead, the Navy’s treatment of helicopters is a result of the combined 
dynamics and interaction of all five models. Finally, this thesis provides several 
recommendations for future Navy policy toward helicopters. 
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A. THE CASE: NAVY HELICOPTERS AND MILITARY INNOVATION 
This thesis addresses and seeks to explain why the Navy is deemphasizing the 
helicopter as an aviation platform after important service in myriad roles and missions for 
than 70 years. Helicopters have been a foundation of the Navy’s capability throughout much 
of the post–World War II era. Today, the helicopter and its associated aviation community 
appear to be at the precipice of being phased out of service. What explains the United States 
Navy’s apparent deemphasis of the helicopter community? This thesis explores the lifetime 
of this venerable platform and the reasons for its decline in the modern era. 
The Navy began exploring the use of helicopters in the early 1940s and has used them 
operationally since 1946.1 Despite contributing to the Navy’s mission for over 70 years and 
accounting for 35 percent of all naval aviation as of 2020,2 the community has struggled to 
gain an influential foothold within naval aviation and the wider Navy. Emerging technology, 
changing operational concepts, organizational preferences, and struggles with matching 
platforms to assigned missions have further contributed to the decline of helicopters and its 
associated aviation community within the Navy over the last decade. In 2020, Navy 
leadership approved the “Carrier Air Wing (CVW) of the Future” concept that, if realized, 
will remove four helicopters—three from HSC squadrons and one from HSM squadrons—
thus reducing air wing helicopters by over 30 percent. The net effect of the new concept will 
be the removal of helicopters at the expense of new aviation technology—F-35s, unmanned 
aerial systems (UAS), CMV-22 Ospreys—and a reduced capacity to support legacy missions 
for the helicopters that remain onboard. 
B. BACKGROUND 
This thesis will fill gaps in the literature on naval aviation, which contains little 
treatment of Navy helicopters in the post–World War II era. Most literature regarding Navy 
 
1 Vincent Secades, The Naval Helicopter: Highlights in Naval Helicopter History (Naval Helicopter 
Association, 2012), 12. 
2 “PERS-43 Aviation Update” (presentation, Navy Personnel Command, August 2020). 
2 
helicopters is either technical in nature or a review of operational history, but there is a 
surprising lack of analysis as to why the Navy helicopter community has remained in a 
secondary role and is now in a further deemphasized role despite growing to a plurality of 
naval aviation officers over the last ten years.3 This thesis will analyze the treatment of the 
helicopter community through the lens of theories of military innovation in order to provide 
explanatory logic and perspective on the historical, current, and future roles of Navy 
helicopters within the Navy and naval aviation. 
The thesis is relevant to current and future Navy and naval aviation policy. The shift 
in aviation concept to the “CVW of the Future” has major implications for naval aviation’s 
largest branch—helicopters. Other Navy operational concepts are shifting toward the focus 
on great power competition (GPC) and the fleet concept of distributed maritime operations 
(DMO). While DMO has spread from the surface community to aviation, there is minimal 
treatment of helicopters in this future vision. Additionally, since the early 2000s, the 
helicopter community has struggled with assigned mission areas, capabilities, and partner 
platforms (e.g., airborne mine countermeasures development, littoral combat ship 
deployments, MQ-8B/C Fire Scout integration). Research, analysis, and recommendations 
generated by this thesis have potential to explain these issues and affect future policy, 
doctrine, and operational use of helicopters. 
The military innovation studies literature provides several theories that seek to 
explain the behavior of military organizations. This thesis will draw upon this literature to 
analyze the Navy’s treatment of the helicopter. In “Military Innovation Studies: 
Interdisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?” Stuart Griffin describes the field of military 
innovation studies as one that leans heavily towards practitioners and academics who aim to 
provide pragmatic research and analysis.4 My personal application of military innovation 
paradigms to Navy helicopters falls in line with military innovation studies as a field. As a 
 
3 “PERS-43 Aviation Update.” The presentation from August 2020 lists helicopters at 35 percent (up 
from 30 percent in 2010) of naval aviation. Tactical Air (TACAIR) accounts for 34 percent (down from 41 
percent in 2010). Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces (MPRF) accounts for 31 percent (up from 29 
percent in 2010).  
4 Stuart Griffin, “Military Innovation Studies: Interdisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (2017): 201–2. 
3 
Navy helicopter pilot that has been selected to return to the Fleet as a helicopter squadron 
commanding officer, I am in a unique position to conduct academic research and discover 
explanations—then directly apply this knowledge in practice. With luck, knowledge gained 
from this thesis will also contribute to the field of military innovation studies. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW: MILITARY INNOVATION STUDIES 
Adam Grissom’s “The Future of Military Innovation Studies” serves as the 
organizing framework for the review of military innovation literature. In the article, Grissom 
explains military innovation as a function of three components: it must change the manner 
in which military organizations function operationally, be “significant in scope and impact,” 
and result in “greater military effectiveness.”5 He compiles military innovation research into 
“four primary schools of thought,” each of which serve as explanatory models to determine 
whether a military organization will innovate.6 The four models are civil-military, inter-
service, intra-service, and cultural. Military innovation scholars also often consider 
technology as the causal factor of innovation. While the explanatory power of technology as 
a unitary model is often contested, I believe it provides additional value in the analysis of 
this research question. Therefore, the following review of the military innovation literature 
is organized and separated according to Grissom’s four schools of thought, with the addition 
of a technology model. 
1. Civil-Military Model 
Grissom summarizes the civil-military model by stating, “senior civilian decision-
makers interpret the geopolitical context and impose innovation upon the military services 
with the help of maverick proxies within the service.”7 He names Barry Posen as the founder 
of military innovation studies and the developer of the civil-military model after the 
publishing of his book, The Sources of Military Doctrine.8 In the book, Posen analyzes the 
 
5 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 
(2006): 907. 
6 Grissom, 908. 
7 Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 920. 
8 Grissom, 906. 
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interwar innovation of Britain, France, and Germany. His primary argument states “civilian 
intervention in military affairs is the key determinant of integration and innovation.”9 The 
assessment produces two primary explanations for military innovation—balance of power 
theory and organization theory—and also gives slight mention to technological and 
geographic determinism. With respect to innovation, balance of power theory asserts that a 
state will innovate in order to balance against a real or perceived threat to the state. Because 
military organizations are averse to “radical change,”10 Posen asserts, “statesmen will 
intervene in the doctrines of their military organizations as part of an overall pattern of 
balancing behavior.”11 Organization theory provides “a good explanation for the operational 
preferences and behavior of military organization,”12 but only predicts innovation to occur 
in the face of battlefield failure or civilian intervention. Military organizations inherently 
stifle bottom-up innovation due to their hierarchical structure.13 Ultimately, Posen finds that 
balance of power theory holds the greatest explanatory power for why a military organization 
innovates.  
2. Inter-service Model 
The inter-service model of military innovation asserts that competition for resources 
between military bureaucracies within a state serves as the catalyst of innovation. While 
militaries will typically desire to maintain control of their traditional missions, new or 
reinvigorated old missions provide a new avenue for inter-service competition. Grissom 
asserts, “services will compete to develop capabilities to address these contested mission 
areas, believing that additional resources will accrue to the winner. The result is 
innovation.”14 Andrew Bacevich provides evidence of the model in The Pentomic Era: The 
U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam, his study of the competition between the U.S. Air 
 
9 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World 
Wars, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 233. 
10 Posen, 54. 
11 Posen, 233. 
12 Posen, 222. 
13 Posen, 224. 
14 Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 910–1. 
5 
Force and U.S. Army in the 1950s. The Eisenhower administration placed priority on nuclear 
warfare which stoked competition for resources between the services. In reaction to the Air 
Force’s advances in nuclear capabilities, the Army reformed doctrine to fight on the nuclear 
battlefield resulting in the Pentomic Army.15 Bacevich includes an illustrative quote from 
military historian S.L.A. Marshall that sums up nature of interservice competition: “There 
are other hungry services and some of their spokesmen might be rash enough to consider 
doing the job alone.”16 This hunger drives innovation.  
3. Intra-service Model 
The intra-service model of military innovation focuses on competition between 
communities within the same service.17 Uniquely, this model treats a service as a collection 
of communities instead of a single, unitary actor. Innovation occurs in modern militaries 
when a community that embraces new capabilities emerges to challenge an established 
community.18 Intra-service competition ultimately boils down to bureaucratic politics. In the 
model’s preeminent work, Winning the Next War, Stephen Rosen asserts, “the problem of 
military innovation is bureaucratic innovation.”19 He conducted 21 case studies—including 
carrier aviation, helicopter air mobility, and submarine warfare—separated into categories 
designated as wartime, peacetime, and technological innovation. Rosen focuses on the 
interaction of communities within a single service and the dynamics that emerge during 
peacetime, which he describes as an “ideological struggle” over a new theory of war.20 This 
new theory of war must be then codified into new missions and tasks, which constitutes 
innovation. The new way of warfare is ultimately cemented through the influence and control 
 
15 A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1986). 
16 Bacevich, 132. 
17 Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 913. 
18 Grissom, 913. 
19 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, ed. Robert J. Art 
and Robert Jervis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2. 
20 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 20. 
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over the promotion of newly indoctrinated officers. As time moves on, officers trained in the 
new theory of victory will promote and further legitimize the new community.21 
4. Cultural Model 
The cultural model of military innovation focuses on strategic and organizational 
culture as causal factors of military innovation. At the time of Grissom’s writing, culture 
lacked equal standing with the other three major models. In “Military Innovation Studies: 
Multidisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?,” Stuart Griffin updates Grissom’s article and gives 
considerable attention to new literature and the rising importance of the cultural model in 
military innovation studies over the intervening decade. He states, “cultural studies have 
proved particularly adept at addressing some conspicuous gaps in our understanding of how 
militaries change,”22 but still lack the explanatory power of the three traditional models.23 
Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff extol culture as a causal factor of military innovation in The 
Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Farrell and Terriff describe 
cultural norms that influence how military organizations react to “strategic, political, and 
technological developments.”24 Dima Adamsky asserts culture is at least equally as 
important as access to technology in Culture of Military Innovation as a military’s unique 
strategic culture explains why and how technological opportunities are leveraged.25 
Ultimately, technology only constitutes an innovation if an organization possesses the 
strategic and organizational culture to exploit it to improve military effectiveness. 
 
21 Rosen, 20–21. 
22 Griffin, “Military Innovation Studies: Interdisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?” 200. 
23 Griffin, 206. 
24 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in The Sources of Military 
Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2002), 7. 
25 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 5. 
7 
5. Technology Model 
The technology model contends that changes in technology determine the course of 
innovation.26 The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in 
the Twenty-First Century, written by George and Meredith Friedman, clearly lays out a case 
for the technology model. The Friedmans assert that precision-guided munitions (PGM) 
redefined the nature of warfare.27 PGMs forced a shift from hundreds of years of total war 
centered around traditional munitions (i.e., guns, explosives) and whole-of-society 
mobilization to warfare based on humane and accurate weapons developed by small portions 
of society.28 According to the Friedmans, technology’s causal relationship with innovation 
is unequaled. Innovation caused by technology—in this case, PGMs—is so impactful as to 
“shape American power and culture.”29 Grissom asserts that the field of military innovation 
studies has largely critiqued and rejected the concept of this technological determinism.30 In 
response, critics developed the concept of “Social Shaping of Technology” (SST), which 
views technology as an idea that becomes innovation as a result of competition between 
competing groups with differing visions of the technology’s implementation.31 
D. HYPOTHESES 
There are several explanations and hypotheses that may explain the apparent 
deemphasis of the helicopter community by the Navy, but there is no evidence to suggest 
that an attempt has been made. This thesis will utilize the four major military innovation 
paradigms with an additional contested model—technology—to determine which has the 
best explanatory power. The following five hypotheses will be tested against empirical 
 
26 Adam Grissom, Sarah Harting, Caitlin Lee, Karl P. Mueller, and Jerry Sollinger, Innovation in the 
United States Air Force: Evidence from Six Cases, PR-1450-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2014), 8.  
27 George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, The Future of Warfare: Power, Technology, and 
American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), x. 
28 Friedman and Friedman, xi. 
29 Friedman and Friedman, 420. 
30 Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 908. 
31 Grissom, 926–7. 
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evidence found in historical and current accounts of the Navy’s use of and policy towards 
helicopters. The five hypotheses are listed below, followed by potential explanations:  
1. Civil-Military Model 
H1: Civilian interpretations of the geopolitical environment drive an intervention in 
Navy policy that caused the Navy to deemphasize the role of the helicopter community. 
A potential explanation is the flagging support for aircraft carriers from civilian 
leaders. If civilian leaders determine that aircraft carriers have questionable relevance in the 
current and future environment, Navy leaders will innovate in order to protect a traditional 
platform and mission. This support may have influenced Navy leaders to approve the “CVW 
of the Future” concept, leading to the diminished role of helicopters in carrier aviation.  
2. Inter-service Model 
H2: Inter-service competition for resources caused the Navy to deemphasize the role 
of the helicopter community. 
A potential explanation is the persistent advancement of UAS in warfighting across 
the Department of Defense (DOD). Each service competes for resources by developing new 
and innovative UAS to conduct missions traditionally executed by manned aircraft. The 
Navy’s use of resources to develop UAS (e.g., MQ-25 Stingray, MQ-8B/C Fire Scout, MQ-
4C Triton) to compete with other services’ UAS efforts could explain the deemphasis of 
helicopters as those resources are no longer allocated the helicopter community.  
3. Intra-service Model 
H3: A new theory of victory and subsequent bureaucratic structure developed by 
senior Navy leaders caused the Navy to deemphasize the role of the helicopter community. 
A potential explanation is the Navy’s evolution of operational concepts. Each change 
in maritime strategy and operational concepts constitutes a new theory of victory. An analysis 
of historical theories of victory may show that other aircraft and capabilities were prioritized 
over helicopters, further supported by a bureaucratic structure that eschewed the helicopter 
community. Despite empirical evidence that a new theory of victory developed in the early 
9 
2000s (i.e., Helicopter Master Plan, Helo Concept of Operations 1.0) brought helicopters to 
the forefront, analysis may find that a promotion pathway was not created for officers from 
the helicopter community to rise to major operational command assignments.  
4. Cultural Model 
H4: The Navy’s unique strategic and organizational culture caused the Navy to 
deemphasize the role of the helicopter community. 
A potential explanation is the historical focus of naval aviation’s strategic culture on 
strike warfare. This strategic culture fosters an organizational culture based on aircraft 
carriers and carrier-based jet aircraft. Norms and values are based on officers that conform 
to the Navy’s organizational preferences of being a pilot of a tactical, offensive, fixed wing, 
carrier-based platform. As a rotary wing platform that is largely used in support or defensive 
roles, helicopters may not be a fit for the Navy’s strategic and organizational culture, further 
explaining the Navy’s deemphasis of the community.  
5. Technology Model 
H5: New advancements in technology and/or inherent limitations in helicopter 
technology caused the Navy to deemphasize the role of the helicopter community. 
A potential explanation is the role of technology in determining the role of 
helicopters. Compared to primarily fixed wing platforms, Navy helicopters are inherently 
limited in speed, endurance, and weapons payload. Helicopter technology has not advanced 
at the same rate as fixed wing aircraft. This may explain that the Navy deemphasized 
helicopters due to their inherent lack of warfighting capability in comparison to more capable 
current (e.g., F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, P-8 Poseidon) and emerging (e.g., F-35 Lightning II, 
CMV-22B Osprey, MQ-25 Stingray) platforms. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The basis of the thesis is a single case study of U.S. Navy helicopters. I have chosen 
this specific case study as I am a career helicopter pilot who will be returning to the Fleet as 
a squadron commanding officer. I am in a unique position to study my professional field in 
10 
an academic setting, then apply my gained knowledge to influence the helicopter community 
upon my return. In addition to personal and professional relevance, the case study selection 
provides for analysis of a major naval aviation branch with potential implications for future 
policy. The majority of materials used for the historical study of the Navy, naval aviation, 
and helicopters are primary sources from professional journals and some secondary historical 
sources. These sources will enable gathering of empirical evidence for comparative study.  
Within the single case study, this thesis will use a comparative study of five models 
of military innovation studies. Four of the models are accepted as major paradigms of 
military innovation. I have chosen a fifth, more minor model as I believe it may have 
considerable explanatory power in support of the thesis. The thesis will apply each model 
separately to determine which military innovation paradigm best explains the deemphasis of 
Navy helicopters. A comparative approach allows for a thorough and broad analysis of causal 
explanations. Sources include literature from the field of military innovation studies. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized to provide context and empirical evidence via a historical 
survey of the Navy and helicopters, which will then be used to evaluate the hypotheses for 
causal explanations. Chapter I explains the problem, explores literature, and describes the 
hypotheses. Chapter II establishes a framework of the problem through a history of Navy 
helicopters from the early 1940s through 2021. The history will include a summary of 
technology and capabilities, missions, strategic and organizational culture, and strategic and 
operational concepts. Chapter III analyzes the Navy helicopter community through the lens 
of the five military innovation models to determine a causal explanation for the Navy’s 
apparent deemphasis of helicopters. Chapter IV reviews the explanatory power of the five 
military innovation models with respect to the Navy helicopter community, highlights 
implications, and provides recommendations for future research in military innovation 
studies and Navy policy towards naval aviation and helicopters. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE U.S. NAVY AND HELICOPTERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For more than 70 years, the U.S. Navy’s helicopter community has been an integral 
part of naval aviation during times of both peace and conflict. The community’s inception 
and continued survival is due to the combination of civil-military, intra-service, inter-
service, cultural, and technological dynamics. The following chapter will analyze the 
Navy’s treatment of the helicopter community through hypotheses based on military 
innovation paradigms. However, it is first necessary to provide contextual understanding. 
This chapter will present empirical evidence through a historical survey of U.S. naval 
aviation, Navy helicopters, naval aviation culture, and Navy strategic thought.  
B. EARLY U.S. NAVAL AVIATION HISTORY 
Less than a decade after the Wright brothers pioneered power flight, U.S. naval 
aviation was born when Eugene Ely—a civilian—flew off the deck of an anchored U.S. 
Navy light cruiser on November 14, 1910.32 After this ground-breaking event, leaders 
envisioned naval aviation forces to be comprised of dirigibles,33 land-based aircraft, and 
ship-supported seaplanes.34 Navy aircraft were to fulfill an auxiliary role as scouts for the 
fleet and gunnery spotters for the capital ship of the day—the battleship.35 Growth was 
slow, as naval aviation only had eight aircraft and 13 officers—pilots—in 1913.36 
However, aviation advocates continued to push for increased funding and bureaucratic 
power. In April 1914, ship-based aircraft provided reconnaissance for ground forces during 
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the United States’ intervention in Vera Cruz during the Mexican Civil War,37 marking the 
first combat use of ship-based aircraft and providing evidence of naval applications for 
aircraft. As the U.S. entered World War I in 1917, naval aviation was comprised of 43 
officers, 200 enlisted personnel, six flying boats, three land planes, two kite balloons, one 
“very unsatisfactory” dirigible, and 45 training seaplanes.38 By war’s end, the branch grew 
to 6,716 officers and 30,693 enlisted personnel39 operating 2,107 aircraft.40 During the 
war, Navy aircraft bombed enemy bases, patrolled for U-boats, and conducted several at-
sea rescues of downed Allied pilots.41 Despite post-war demobilization, leaders recognized 
the emerging capabilities of naval aviation, placing the branch in a relatively protected 
status.  
The interwar period marked significant growth for naval aviation. In 1921, naval 
aviation was established organizationally with the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics 
(BuAer),42 cementing aviation as an integral—but still fledgling—component of the Navy. 
During this period, naval aviation leaders strived for a balance between complementing 
and challenging the established conception of the battleship of the center of the battle fleet. 
“Battleship admirals”43 filled the senior ranks and thus had control over naval applications 
of aircraft, which were largely seen as auxiliary to the battleship. However, there were 
several battleship admirals that saw the potential of aviation. Arguably the most significant 
advancement of the period was the development of aircraft carriers, specialized carrier 
aircraft, and carrier tactics and doctrine. Naval aviation advocates successfully challenged 
the battleship paradigm during Fleet Problems IX (1929) and X (1930), when 
independently-steaming carriers launched strikes against land targets—“sinking” the 
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Panama Canal—and main battle forces comprised of battleships and other carriers.44 These 
exercises showed the potential for Navy aircraft to operate as an independent striking force 
and project power at ranges not previously possible with a flexibility that enabled surprise. 
By 1939, the Navy had five carriers and 1,315 combat aircraft.45 Despite the success and 
expansion, leaders’ fear of carrier vulnerability and limited firepower due aircraft payload 
limitations kept aviation in an auxiliary role as the U.S. approached World War II.46 The 
paradigm shifted from battleships to naval aviation—specifically, carrier aviation—after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed American battleships—a fate the carriers 
avoided by happenstance. Aviation’s role as the premier branch of the Navy was further 
cemented with combat success in the Pacific during World War II, a position that has yet 
to be relinquished. 
Entering World War II, naval aviation comprised a significant force that would 
grow further throughout the war. In 1940, the force was comprised of carrier-based 
fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo planes; flying boats and land-based aircraft for patrol; 
spotter seaplanes launched from cruisers and battleships; various utility and transport 
aircraft; and several blimps.47 While this inventory fulfilled a broad scope of missions, 
naval aviation did not possess a capability to counter the German U-boat threat to Allied 
shipping in the Atlantic. Leaders desired an aircraft that could operate from an escort ship 
and provide air coverage for the convoys once they exceeded the range of land-based 
aircraft. This is where the development of the helicopter for naval applications began. 
C. HISTORY OF U.S. NAVY HELICOPTERS 
The history of Navy helicopters begins with the Army, which led helicopter 
development until World War II. U.S. military helicopter development is characterized by 
early progress, failure, abandonment, adaptation, and eventual success and integration. 
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From the beginning, aviation advocates—both civilian and military—primarily focused on 
heavier-than-air aircraft due to their potential for practical applications. In contrast, a 
combination of limited technological advancements and negative perceptions dogged 
helicopter development. Frenchman Louis Breguet designed the first piloted helicopter to 
successfully fly in August 1907, but the aircraft was plagued by the lack of stability and 
controllability.48 In January 1909, Wilbur Wright notably dismissed the helicopter as a 
practical machine by stating, “the helicopter is much easier to design than the aeroplane 
[sic] but it is worthless when done.”49 Despite this prevalent sentiment, there was still a 
significant movement behind developing helicopter technology.  
The Navy’s early treatment of helicopters was aspirational. As early as 1908, naval 
officers envisioned an aircraft “that could be stowed aboard ship and launched from a deck 
as an air scout…with the possibility of hovering.”50 Unfortunately, contemporary 
technology could not produce a helicopter at the time and the Navy’s focus turned to the 
aforementioned ship-launched seaplanes for use as gunnery spotters. Over the ensuing 
three decades, the Navy stood by while the Army led helicopter development. 
Since Breguet’s helicopter took flight, minimal progress was achieved over the next 
decade until World War I created a demand by military leaders for “a machine capable of 
up-and-down flight and hence operations from restricted area…that could hover in the sky 
over the enemy and spot his movements.”51 During the war, balloons were used in this 
role, but were limited in maneuverability. With wartime experience providing practical 
applications, the Army began developing the helicopter in earnest. In June 1921, the Army 
contracted George de Bothezat—a Russian exile—to design and build the Army’s first 
helicopter.52 Despite a successful flight in December 1922, the Army’s Chief of the Air 
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Service ordered the program abandoned due to not meeting expectations of “stability and 
required performance.”53 This ushered in another era of minimal progress in helicopter 
development. 
After the de Bothezat failure, the aviation industry and U.S. military pivoted toward 
developing a different type of rotary-wing aircraft. The autogiro—also known as the 
gyroplane—had the fuselage and front propellor of an airplane, suspended beneath rotating 
wings. Similar to a helicopter, autogiros were capable of slow flight that fixed-wing aircraft 
could not achieve but were unable to hover like a helicopter. A Spaniard—Juan de la 
Cierva— created the first autogiro to successfully fly in January 1923.54 The autogiro 
proved to be more stable and controllable than helicopters of the period. Recognizing this, 
the Navy joined in development and testing. In January 1931, the Navy procured a Cierva 
autogiro built by an American manufacturer, the Pitcairn Aircraft Company.55 The first 
rotary-wing landing and takeoff from an underway ship—the USS Langley (CV-1)—
occurred on September 23, 1931.56 The Navy evaluated autogiros until the late 1930s, but 
they were ultimately abandoned for not meeting performance expectations. Additionally, 
advancements in fixed-wing design allowed for airplanes to fly slower than autogiros,57 
while Igor Sikorsky’s revolutionary single-main-rotor helicopter design58 proved that 
vertical flight was possible—and practical for military use.  
The true genesis of the Navy helicopter community began in the late 1930s and is 
intertwined with the Coast Guard. The Dorsey Act of 1938 earmarked $2 million for rotary-
wing research and development, leading to the creation of an inter-agency board to 
administer the funds.59 The Navy was indirectly represented by CDR William Kossler, 
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USCG, considered a founding father of helicopter naval aviation.60 In 1941, the Coast 
Guard was transferred operationally to the Navy and tasked with overseeing helicopter test 
and development.61 Despite the earlier unsuccessful attempts with autogiros, a small—but 
passionate—group of Coast Guard and Navy aviators pushed for the integration of 
helicopters for use in search and rescue (SAR) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW).62 At the 
time, submarines posed a substantial threat to U.S. and Allied shipping in the Atlantic 
Ocean. The group of aviators, led by LCDR Frank Ericksen, USCG, persuaded the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Russell Waesche, of the viability of helicopters 
for naval applications by emphasizing ASW capabilities.63 Ericksen was convinced that 
helicopters could be the extended “eyes and ears of the convoy escorts”64 and eventually 
use radar and a dipping sonar for further submarine detection and convoy protection. 
Admiral Waesche convinced the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, 
USN, of the military use of the emerging technology, who then directed a “joint board” 
comprised of the Navy, Coast Guard, British Admiralty, and Royal Air Force to evaluate 
the viability of ship-based ASW helicopters.65 Demonstrations and tests proved the 
concept and Admiral King further directed the creation of a helicopter class desk within 
BuAer,66 cementing the helicopter as a part of naval aviation. The Navy ordered several 
helicopters for ASW and rescue duty but World War II ended before the Navy took 
delivery. 
The post-war period through the Korean War is characterized by continued 
development of technology, capabilities, and doctrine. Helicopters continued in the ASW 
role and began integrating with smaller ships. In 1949, the Chief of Naval Operations 
directed the conversion of cruisers and battleships for helicopters to replace seaplanes as 
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gunnery spotters.67 During this Korean War, helicopters also became integral to fleet 
logistics and provided a combat rescue capability for downed pilots along the coast of the 
Korean Peninsula.68 In September 1950, during the amphibious landings at Wonsan, new 
capability was inadvertently discovered when a helicopter pilot sighted and photographed 
two moored mines while conducting a rescue.69 This action set the foundation for a new 
helicopter mission—airborne mine countermeasures (MCM)—and technological 
developments that still remain a part of naval aviation.  
During the Vietnam War and the Cold War, the Navy found new uses—and created 
new missions—for helicopters. More advanced helicopters emerged, extending missions 
to anti-surface warfare (ASuW),70 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR),71 
vertical replenishment (VERTREP),72 combat search and rescue (CSAR),73 and furthered 
airborne MCM.74 A niche mission emerged during the Vietnam War—naval special 
warfare (NSW) support. From 1967 through 1972, the Helicopter Attack Squadron Light 
THREE (HAL-3) Seawolves provided air coverage for Navy SEALs and River Patrol Boats 
(PBR).75 Although the Seawolves were disestablished before departing Vietnam, Navy 
helicopters have provided continuous NSW support in subsequent conflicts with the legacy 
remaining today, primarily with the HSC-85 Firehawks, currently the Navy’s only special 
operations support squadron. The expansion in missions also had effects on the 
bureaucracy. With more missions, came more platforms that needed more pilots and crew 
to operate and maintenance personnel to keep flying. This led to the creation of several 
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helicopter type wings76 (O-6 commands) and the Chief of Naval Operations opening a 
transition pipeline for Fleet aviators to become helicopter pilots.77 The type wings put 
helicopters on equal standing—at least, bureaucratically—with the other naval aviation 
communities and marked the beginning of an expansion that continued through the late 
2000s. 
After the end of the Cold War, Navy helicopters had considerable momentum as a 
part of the Navy’s emphasis on asymmetric threats and the transition to littoral warfare. 
Experience in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm proved the utility of helicopters against 
smaller surface combatants.78 Naval strategy focused on the coasts called for increased use 
of smaller ships—frigates, destroyers, cruisers—at the expense of blue water aircraft 
carriers. Strategists called for helicopters embarked on the smaller ships to become the 
center piece of the air domain due to their unique capabilities. Helicopters had carried 
torpedoes and antisurface missiles for some time, but calls were made to leverage emerging 
technology and further increase helicopter armament— with missiles, machine guns, and 
rockets—for surface threats in the congested coastal areas.79 This flood of support for the 
increased naval use of helicopters continued through the turn of the millennium. 
In the early 2000s, Navy leadership introduced a new acquisition strategy and force 
structure that renewed enthusiasm for the future of helicopter community. The budget-
friendly plan—called the Helicopter Master Plan (HMP)—aimed to reduce the number of 
fleet helicopter types from seven specialized airframes to two multi-mission helicopters 
based on the ubiquitous H-60—the MH-60R Seahawk and MH-60S Knighthawk.80 
Concurrently, a new Helicopter Concept of Operations (now referred to as Helo CONOPs 
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1.0) redesigned the rotary wing force structure and planned to streamline four legacy 
communities to two based on the capabilities of the new platforms.81 Helo CONOPs 1.0 
doubled the number of helicopters onboard the aircraft carrier, potentially facilitating 
increased influence within carrier aviation. The Seahawks were organized in maritime 
strike squadrons (HSM) and deployed on aircraft carriers and smaller surface combatants 
with a focus on ASW and ASuW. The Knighthawks were organized into sea combat 
squadrons (HSC) and primarily deployed on aircraft carriers, large amphibious assault 
ships, and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships with a focus on ASuW, SAR, logistics, 
and NSW support.82 The Navy also intended for the Knighthawk and HSC to take over the 
organic airborne mine countermeasures (OAMCM) mission but experienced delays in 
achieving initial operational capability and has yet to deploy in support of the mission (as 
of 2021). As a result, a legacy platform—the MH-53E Sea Dragon—and squadron type—
mine countermeasures (HM)—remains in the Navy’s rotary wing inventory. In 2008, the 
HMP and Helo CONOPs 1.0 debuted operationally when both an HSC and HSM squadron 
made their maiden deployment as part of a CVW.83 Another defining characteristic of the 
HMP and Helo CONOPs was the inclusion and integration of rotary-wing UAS—the MQ-
8B/C Fire Scout—in the helicopter force structure. 
In 2020, the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Vice Admiral Dewolfe Miller, USN, 
approved a new direction for the future of naval aviation. The concept—named the “CVW 
of the Future”—emphasizes the importance and integration of emerging platforms—the F-
35 Lightning II, CMV-22B Osprey, MQ-25 Stingray—while subsequently reducing the 
number of helicopters within the CVW by over 30 percent.84 In reaction, the Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA) and helicopter community leaders began developing Helo 
CONOPs 2.0, which aims to assess the current and future capabilities of the Navy 
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helicopter community in a high-end fight against near-peer adversaries.85 As of this 
writing, the results of the study have not been released, but there will be an undeniable 
impact on the helicopter community that ranges beyond the already published reduction of 
helicopters within the air wing. 
D. THE CULTURE OF NAVAL AVIATION 
Culture is a product of history, motivations, and preferences that, in turn, shapes 
the behavior of an organization.86 Within the DOD, the Navy has a culture that is distinct 
from the other services that explains its unique strategic and organizational behavior. This 
behavior is evident in which platforms are funded87 and who gets promoted, among others. 
Even further—within the Navy—naval aviation has a distinct sub-culture that informs the 
treatment of the helicopter community throughout its history. This section will provide a 
brief overview of the culture of naval aviation since its inception, providing context for the 
following chapter’s analysis of how this culture has affected the Navy helicopter 
community. 
Before aviation integrated into naval warfare, surface warfare officers dominated 
the Navy and set its culture. Until the beginning of World War II, these officers created a 
battle force centered around capital ships that controlled the seas and projected offensive 
power far away from American shores. This culture of the offensive was conveyed by 
capital ships: the Great White Fleet, World War I era dreadnoughts, and interwar 
battleships.88 After the destruction of the Pacific Fleet battleships at Pearl Harbor, the 
offensive culture almost seamlessly transitioned from the surface fleet to aviation. Luckily, 
naval aviators took advantage of the limited opportunities provided in the interwar period 
to develop carrier strike tactics, which eased the transition from auxiliary to the primary 
 
85 Mike Weaver and Chris Richard, “Navy Helicopters are Changing Course,” Proceedings 146, no. 9 
(Sep 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/september/navy-helicopters-are-changing-
course. 
86 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 6–10. 
87 Builder, 5. 
88 Builder, 21.  
21 
striking force. It is also important to note that many of the commanders famous for 
revolutionizing carrier aviation in the interwar years and leading the Navy to victory in the 
Pacific began their careers as surface officers. Regardless, naval aviation proved an optimal 
embodiment to continue the Navy’s offensive culture.  
After achieving intra-service primacy in World War II, aviators—specifically, 
carrier-based tail-hook pilots—ascended to the top of the Navy’s hierarchy.89 While losing 
some ground at higher ranks within the larger Navy to submarine officers since then,90 
carrier-based, fixed-wing aviators remain the pinnacle of naval aviation, filling 57 percent 
of aviation major command billets—air wings, carriers, large amphibious ships, bases—
and 71 percent of aviation flag ranks.91 Direct combat experience only reinforces this 
position, as the majority of combat hours since World War II have been flown by these 
aviators. This is especially important as the conventional Navy has minimal direct combat 
experience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.92 These factors combined create a culture 
that values combat-experienced, carrier-based pilots that conduct offensive strike 
missions—a small and very specific group of officers. As these officers embody the culture 
of naval aviation and the larger Navy, they promote to higher ranks and fill influential 
positions. The structure of Navy promotion allows warfare communities to select their own 
officers for promotion up through the rank of captain (O-6). In these higher roles, senior 
officers on promotion boards frequently select officers with similar records,93 reinforcing 
and perpetuating the culture and preferences. As the polar opposite, helicopters pilots 
historically struggle to compete for promotion and influence against these cultural 
preferences. The transition in focus to asymmetric threats in the 2000s provided a prime 
arena for helicopters to gain potential combat experience and, hence, cultural influence, 
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but few real opportunities arose. Furthermore, the GPC era appears to shift favor back 
toward carrier aviation. The emergence of UAS may be the ultimate causal factor in 
changing the culture of naval aviation, but that will take decades to come to fruition. 
E. NAVY STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS, AND HELICOPTERS 
Since the inception of helicopters, the strategic thought of naval leaders—and the 
operational concepts that support it—has both benefited and hindered the helicopter 
community. Due to classification levels, specifics about the Navy’s strategy and 
operational concepts throughout history is difficult to fully explain. Further difficulty 
emerges from whittling down the broad maritime strategic thought due to the Navy’s 
institutional tendency of not relying on a single strategy.94 However, persistent themes—
power projection, sea control, and adaptations to new threats—emerge to shed light on the 
treatment of helicopters. This section will provide a historical survey of Navy strategy and 
operational concepts, and the helicopter community’s contributions to each. 
Maritime strategy in World War II centered primarily on sea control and power 
projection. As the reality of a two-ocean war emerged, American leaders created a “Europe 
first”95 strategy that prioritized the Atlantic theater over the Pacific. In the Atlantic, 
materiel was transported to Britain for the war effort against Germany under the Lend-
Lease Act, starting in early 1941. In September 1941, President Roosevelt expanded the 
commitment by providing convoy escorts for British ships enroute to Iceland, making the 
U.S. a cobelligerent with Britain against Germany.96 Almost immediately, German U-
boats began engaging American ships, which had no aerial coverage once outside the range 
of shore-based aircraft. Gaining sea control in the North Atlantic became the strategic 
imperative for the Navy. Controlling the seas meant neutralizing—or at least deterring—
the U-boat threat in order to keep supplies flowing to the Allies and keep the war away 
from mainland America. In attempt to contribute to this strategy and gain further support 
for development, helicopter pioneers from the Coast Guard and Navy shifted the mission 
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focus of helicopters from rescue to ASW.97 Ship-based helicopters would provide aerial 
ASW (and, secondarily, rescue) for the convoys, facilitating local sea control and 
supporting the strategic effort. Unfortunately for the fledgling helicopter community, the 
U-boat threat diminished, and the Navy did not take delivery of helicopters in time to affect 
the war effort. In the Pacific, a progressive leapfrog of power projection and offensive sea 
control—led by naval aviation and carriers—characterized maritime strategy that led to 
victory against Japan.98 If helicopters had been available for the Pacific theater, they likely 
would have been used to defend surface ships from Japanese submarines. Although never 
seeing combat, World War II set the stage for ASW to be the Navy helicopter’s lasting 
impact on maritime strategy. 
The Cold War era was the proving ground for Navy helicopters. Navy strategic 
thought primarily focused on deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, which prioritized 
nuclear submarines and supercarriers.99 Sea control and power projection were still 
foundationally important, but the post-war demobilization and competition for resources 
forced the Navy to adapt strategy.100 During this period, helicopters indirectly facilitated 
strategy through defensive and supporting concepts of ASW, logistics, MCM, gunnery 
spotting, NSW support, and CSAR. ASW technology continued to improve with the 
development of dipping sonar, extending helicopter capabilities by enabling detection of 
submerged enemy submarines.101 Beginning in 1946, these aircraft were organized into 
squadrons—eventually called anti-submarine squadrons (HS)—that deployed on carriers 
and other large ships.102 As the Cold War continued, ASW helicopters received significant 
technology upgrades and were eventually outfitted with a torpedo, giving an offensive edge 
for helicopters to support the Navy’s defense-in-depth concept.103 By late 1949, 
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helicopters replaced seaplanes onboard large surface ships104 and provided ASW, MCM, 
SAR, and spotting for naval gunfire during the Korean War.105 
A lack of naval threats characterized the Vietnam War. As a result, the helicopter 
community adapted to support operational imperatives. During the conflict, carriers 
launched daily alpha strikes against targets in North Vietnam, leading to significant 
numbers of aircraft shootdowns. In response, a large portion of helicopters onboard carriers 
were stripped of ASW gear, painted camouflage, and tasked with a new concept—
dedicated CSAR of downed aviators.106 Doctrine was created that included overhead 
fixed-wing defensive support—rescue combat air patrol (RESCAP)107—and a “lily pad” 
network of cruisers and destroyers to provide fuel and navigational guidance, extending 
the rescue helicopters’ range and allowing for inland rescues.108 This adaptation led to the 
creation of a new squadron type in 1967—helicopter combat support (HC).109 The lack of 
naval threats also pushed ships closer to the coast and into inland waterways. As previously 
mentioned, the HAL-3 Seawolves supported the “brown water” Navy through operations 
with SEALs and PBRs.110 From February to July 1973, MCM helicopters cleared mines 
by towing a magnetic hydrofoil, a new technology that allowed access to Haiphong Harbor 
during Operation Endsweep.111 During both the Korean and Vietnam wars, helicopters 
conducted ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore logistics that enabled carriers and surface 
combatants to remain at sea. While not the face of deterrence in the Cold War, the 
helicopter community mastered these auxiliary concepts and missions that underwrote 
maritime strategy.  
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The end of the Cold War thrust the Navy into a new period of strategic thought. 
Historically, the Navy has invested in broadly diversified forces.112 This is no more evident 
than in the creation of the HMP and Helo CONOPs 1.0 in the early 2000s, which called for 
diverse and expanded mission sets for the helicopter community. A broad scope of 
missions—coupled with advancements in technology—led to an unprecedented investment 
by the Navy in multi-mission helicopters over specialization. While the HMP was more of 
an acquisition strategy and force structure realignment, the operational and tactical 
concepts within Helo CONOPs 1.0 emphasized the use of the newly armed helicopters to 
support the shift to asymmetric warfare in the post-Cold War era. Experience with small 
Iraqi surface boats in Desert Storm113—and Iranian forces since—reinforced the shift 
away from a naval peer adversary. With two squadrons on the carrier (instead of one), 
helicopter aviators created a “hunter-killer”114 concept that leveraged the strengths of both 
helicopter types to combat smaller surface threats to the carrier strike group (CSG). 
However, multi-mission capabilities have again taken a subordinate role to specialization. 
Recently, the “jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none” syndrome nurtured by the wide scope of 
missions conducted by multi-mission helicopters has affected a large portion of the 
helicopter community—specifically, HSC squadrons—as the preference of naval aviation 
leaders appears to pivot back toward higher-technology, more specialized aircraft. This is 
embodied in the aforementioned “CVW of the Future” concept, where utility-based MH-
60S helicopters found in HSC squadrons have been reduced by 50 percent on the carrier, 
compared to 14 percent of the more-specialized MH-60R helicopter found in HSM 
squadrons.115 
Despite an emphasis on countering asymmetric threats, the Navy continued to 
prioritize power projection throughout the Global War on Terror. In addition to traditional 
missions, the power projection umbrella extended to include missions that were previously 
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lesser emphasized, including special operations and rescue.116 Navy helicopters provided 
capabilities for these specific missions during the Iraq War in the form of NSW support 
and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Extending the lineage of the HAL-3 Seawolves in 
Vietnam, HCS-4 and HCS-5—later redesignated HSC-84 and HSC-85—conducted 
combat missions in Iraq in support of Navy SEALs and other special operators from 2003 
until 2011.117 In 2006, the helicopter community created a new concept to fulfill a need 
for MEDEVAC capabilities at the request of the Army. Personnel and aircraft from two 
squadrons and two different locations—HSC-25 from Guam and HS-15 from Jacksonville, 
Florida—combined to make the 2515th Navy Air Ambulance Detachment (NAAD).118 
Based in both Kuwait and Basra, Iraq, the detachment conducted MEDEVACs in support 
of ground operations and provided support for ships in the Persian Gulf. During the same 
timeframe, MH-53E helicopters from HC-4—normally tasked with ship-to-shore heavy lift 
support—conducted combat logistics missions throughout southern Iraq.119 All told, Navy 
helicopter crews flew over 3,500 combat hours in support of NSW and conducted 
MEDEVACs for over 2,200 personnel during the Iraq War.120  
The era of GPC has ushered in a new operational concept of DMO. The essence of 
DMO calls for a distribution of firepower across a wide area and multiple domains in order 
to both overwhelm an adversary and decrease vulnerability by dispersing friendly 
forces.121 The surface community originally conceived the concept—coined distributed 
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lethality—as a return to sea control122 and the larger Navy is exploring strategic and force 
structure implications for the entire fleet for high-end conflict against Russia or China. In 
the aforementioned Helo CONOPs 2.0, leaders are developing a future for the helicopter 
community with DMO as a primary consideration.123 However the current force structure 
may still facilitate support for DMO. The “CVW of the Future” concept, in many ways 
also a reaction to GPC, may benefit the helicopter community by releasing four helicopters 
from the current air wing. These extra helicopters and their broad capabilities could be 
shifted to shore-base at geographic choke points124 or embark on traditional surface 
combatants (e.g., cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships), and non-traditional ships (e.g., 
expeditionary sea base ships), distributing helicopter lethality further across the fleet. As 
Helo CONOPs 2.0 development is on-going as of 2021, it remains to be seen how the 
helicopter community will adapt to support DMO. Another aspect yet to be published is 
the role that next manned helicopter—the Future Vertical Lift Maritime Strike (FVL-
MS)—and rotary UAS will play in Helo CONOPs 2.0 and DMO.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter’s purpose is to provide a historical understanding of the Navy, naval 
aviation, the helicopter community, and naval strategy. The following chapter will analyze 
the empirical evidence to test the hypotheses and explain the Navy’s treatment of 
helicopters. Why did the Navy pursue helicopters and continue to fund their existence? 
What explains the limited role and lack of investment in advanced technology compared 
to other naval aviation communities? Is this even the case? And, ultimately, what explains 
the current perceived deemphasis of Navy helicopters? The next chapter will apply the 
military innovation paradigms in an attempt to answer these questions. 
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III. U.S. NAVY HELICOPTERS: A MILITARY INNOVATION 
CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1938, a combination of civil-military, inter-service, intra-service, cultural and 
technological dynamics guided the inception, development, and continued existence of 
helicopters within the U.S. Navy. This chapter’s purpose is to analyze empirical evidence 
from this period through the lens of military innovation paradigms to explain the Navy’s 
treatment of helicopters. Evidence is compiled and examined within five military innovation 
models: civil-military, inter-service, intra-service, cultural, and technology. 
In the end, the strongest explanatory power is found in the combination and ever-
shifting interaction between the five models. However, evidence suggests that each model 
contributes differing levels of impact. Individually, intra-service, cultural, and technology 
dynamics seem to each offer a compelling model to understand the helicopter community’s 
standing within the Navy. Aspects of the inter-service model are also valid, but more 
indirectly. Civil-military dynamics appear to have minimal influence. Ultimately, this 
chapter’s goal is to present the empirical evidence to establish if and why the Navy is 
deemphasizing the helicopter community. 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY MODEL 
Direct civilian intervention with respect to the Navy helicopter community has been 
minimal. Intervention that did occur was largely felt indirectly—both through greater 
changes in Navy doctrine and a notable lack of intervention in the face of other Navy and 
naval aviation platforms. In the lead-up to World War II, President Roosevelt touted a policy 
of “Europe first” that centered around U.S. aid to the Allies via the Lend-Lease Act.125 The 
shipping that delivered aid required protection from German U-boats, resulting in a doctrinal 
change for Navy warships serving as escorts to merchant convoys on the voyage across the 
Atlantic. As coastal patrol aircraft on both sides of the Atlantic were limited in range, there 
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was a considerable gap in air coverage and protection.126 Generally, this forced the Navy to 
find solutions for the air gap— which may have led to Navy support for addition of 
helicopters to the convoys. More recently, the civil-military paradigm has been marked by 
the lack of intervention on behalf of helicopters. Since the Reagan era, there is evidence that 
civilian support for carriers and carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft has come at the expense of 
helicopters. Currently, considerable resources are committed to fielding the next-generation 
fighters and logistics aircraft, improving existing fixed-wing aircraft, and developing carrier-
based unmanned aerial systems. These efforts support the Navy’s preference to maintain the 
central position of naval aviation’s central force—the aircraft carrier and carrier air wing. In 
the zero-sum nature of budgetary competition and without support from civilian leaders, the 
Navy helicopter community lacks advocates for further development against the strength of 
these other naval aviation communities and their civilian supporters.  
The most noteworthy civilian involvement in the development of Navy helicopters 
was made by President Roosevelt. The period between the world wars marked a significant 
development of military applications of aviation. Within navies, the aircraft carrier emerged 
as challenger to the battleship as the capital ship and center of naval combat power.127 
Additional roles and types of carriers emerged to meet strategic needs. Prior to U.S. 
involvement in World War II, the Royal Navy employed fixed-wing aircraft from small 
carriers to combat the German U-boat threat against British convoys in the Atlantic by 
increasing detection capabilities and enhancing protection of shipping.128 Learning from the 
British case, President Roosevelt suggested, in October 1940, that merchant ships be 
converted to autogiro carriers in support of trans-Atlantic convoys, whose autogiros could 
then “hover ahead of convoys, detect submarines, and drop smoke bombs to indicate their 
location to attacking escort craft.”129 At the time, autogiros—the immediate rotary-wing 
precursor to helicopters—were being developed and tested for military use. The quotation 
shows early naval thought by the Commander-in-Chief for rotary-wing aircraft as an anti-
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submarine platform to decrease the vulnerability of Allied shipping during World War II 
convoy operations in the Atlantic. It is plausible that the sitting American president—also a 
former assistant secretary of the navy—used his position to force Navy leaders to accelerate 
develop and implement rotary-wing aircraft within fleet operations, but it is uncertain 
whether his thoughts translated to direct intervention or even minor influence. However, 
there is evidence that a “maverick” mid-grade Coast Guard officer, LCDR Ericksen—
seconded to the Navy during World War II—switched the emphasis of the helicopter mission 
from rescue to anti-surface warfare in a 1942 memorandum to the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard.130 There is no evidence of advocacy by President Roosevelt for LCDR Erickson’s 
cause. Autogiros were found incapable of carrying a useful weapons payload and, ultimately, 
the first military helicopter was not introduced until 1944131—in time to test the convoy 
escort concept, but too late to prove impactful on naval warfare in World War II. Anti-
submarine helicopter development was deemed too expensive and not essential to the war 
effort, and mid-grade naval officers found it impossible to change the policy without civilian 
activism as the U-boat threat dwindled as the war concluded.132 The capability was 
eventually filled once the U.S. entered the war by fixed-wing aircraft embarked on escort 
carriers, starting in mid-1942.133 Due to the lack of existing literature on the subject, it is 
difficult to establish whether President Roosevelt’s comments had a causal effect on 
accelerated development or integration of helicopters within the Navy.  
Navy helicopters received vacillating support from civilian leaders during the Cold 
War. In the post-war period, helicopters across all services emerged as the most effective 
platform for SAR. Recognizing the importance of a modern rescue capability, the Navy 
awarded a contract in 1957 to Kaman Corporation for a utility helicopter that represented the 
“highest level of helicopter technology of its era.”134 At that time, Kaman helicopters alone 
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accounted for over 20,000 lives rescued.135 In the mid-1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara challenged the necessity for such an expensive helicopter by asking, “how many 
lives will the Navy be unable to save if it doesn’t have this expensive procurement?”136 
Navy leaders failed to sufficiently answer the question and the program was canceled. By 
denying the Navy helicopter community access to the highest available technology, 
Secretary McNamara effectively squashed further development of helicopter missions and a 
potential boost in bureaucratic influence. As the Cold War continued in to the 1980s, the 
Soviet submarine threat became more of a concern for American leaders. Members of 
Congress called for the Navy to increase ASW capabilities—to include a new carrier-based 
ASW helicopter—over fielding 15 aircraft carriers.137 For his part, Secretary of the Navy 
John Lehman backed the new ASW helicopter and even pushed for expanded capabilities,138 
insisting that if opponents resisted, “blood is on their hands.”139 Eventually, the aging SH-3 
was replaced by a modern carrier-based ASW helicopter in the SH-60F CV-Helo in 1989,140 
but evidence shows the decision was based more on the need for a replacement to further 
protect aircraft carriers as an auxiliary over supporting the expansion of the helicopter 
branch. In the end, Secretary Lehman cemented the focus of his advocacy behind carriers 
over other platforms, stating “the last ship we give up is the carrier.”141 
Continued civilian support and intervention in the plight of the aircraft carrier 
explains the lack of intervention for the helicopter community in recent years. The latest case 
is found in the pivot away from asymmetric threats—that have characterized the Global War 
on Terrorism—toward peer adversaries and brings the question of aircraft carrier 
vulnerability to the forefront. China and Russia both possess considerable anti-access/area-
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denial (A2AD) capabilities that affect both the carrier itself and its striking arm—the carrier 
air wing. China’s development of anti-ship ballistic missiles and advanced air-to-air missiles, 
combined with potent Russian air defense systems, provides the greatest threat to American 
carriers and air wing aircraft since World War II.142 These vulnerabilities, combined with 
their expense, have attracted criticism from members of Congress and academia.143 In 2020, 
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
required the Navy to “report on aircraft carrier air wing composition…to better prepare for 
potential conflicts envisioned in the National Defense Strategy.”144 As a result, Navy leaders 
conceived the “CVW of the Future,” based on a combination of manned and unmanned 
platforms. The concept will earmark funding for the F-35 Lightning II and next-generation 
fighters, an additional E-2D Hawkeye, new tiltrotor CMV-22B Osprey logistics aircraft, and 
the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray refueling tanker.145 The new air wing reduces risk to the 
carrier by extending the range of the aircraft, allowing the carrier to remain out of reach of 
Chinese anti-ship missiles. UAS integration charts the course for further unmanned aircraft, 
reducing risk to aircrew and overall costs. The effects of the Congressional intervention and 
the resultant conception of the future air wing on Navy helicopters is two-fold: resources that 
could be used on improving existing—or developing new—helicopters are unobtainable; and 
over 30 percent of the helicopters will be removed from air wings and carriers to make room 
for newer and more capable platforms. The Navy helicopter community leaders lack the 
bureaucratic power to fight against being pulled from the center of naval aviation—the 
carrier—and do not have the civilian activists to keep them in place. 
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C. INTER-SERVICE MODEL 
Inter-service dynamics—ranging from cooperation to competition—have played a 
considerable role throughout the history of Navy helicopters. Cooperation characterized the 
early development phase. On June 30, 1938, an inter-agency board was created to administer 
rotary-wing development funds earmarked by the Dorsey Act.146 Within the military 
services, the Army took the lead and awarded contracts to Platt-LePage and Sikorsky in 
1940.147 The Army led testing throughout the development phase with officers from the 
Navy, Coast Guard, and Royal Navy consistently present.148 Cooperation was forced on the 
Coast Guard and Navy as President Roosevelt transferred operational control of the Coast 
Guard to the Navy in 1941 in anticipation of U.S. involvement in World War II.149 In the 
process, the Navy gained several mid-grade and senior Coast Guard officers that advocated 
for the use of helicopters for ASW and rescue missions. After a successful demonstration of 
a Sikorsky XR-4 in 1943, Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, assigned 
responsibility for helicopter development—specifically for ASW duty—to the Coast 
Guard.150 The Navy’s increasing desire for ASW capabilities over the Army’s priority for 
an observation platform was the point of divergence. On May 4, 1943, Admiral King directed 
the creation of what would become the “Combined Board for the Evaluation of the Ship-
Based Helicopter in Antisubmarine Warfare,” which initially included the Navy, Coast 
Guard, British Admiralty, and Royal Air Force.151 While the board did eventually include 
the Army, the Navy’s increased involvement in helicopter development marked a dynamic 
shift between the services. Cooperation now became competition between the Army on one 
side and the Navy and Coast Guard on the other. 
Competition became more prevalent in the military drawdown in the post-war era. 
World War II effectively ended a period of rapid innovation in naval applications of the 
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helicopter. For example, immediately after V-J Day, 390 out of a joint Navy-Army order of 
455 Sikorsky R-5s were canceled (with the remaining 65 already delivered).152 A new era 
of resource competition began. Continuing a procurement tactic from the end of World War 
II, the Navy deliberately contracted helicopter manufacturers that the Army—now Air 
Force—had not. The result was Piasecki’s HRP-1 “Flying Banana” which had a payload 
three times larger than any other helicopter. This effectively silenced criticism that the Navy 
had not leveraged the new technology and capabilities and was no longer losing the inter-
service competition.153 
In the post-war period through the Korean War, the Navy continued to find 
innovative uses to match emerging helicopter technology. The Navy continued ASW 
development, successfully testing a dipping sonar against a captured German submarine in 
May 1946.154 This capability not only proved vital for fleet defense, but also helped close 
out competition in aviation ASW from other services. During the Korean War, Navy 
helicopters—operating from aircraft carriers and large warships—provided SAR for downed 
aviators, fleet cargo and passenger transfers, spotting for shore bombardment, and mine 
clearing.155 In the competition for resources during this era, the Navy developed innovative 
applications in tandem with higher-technology helicopters.  
In the modern era, UAS emerged as an area for inter-service competition that effects 
both service level budgets and the future of manned aircraft communities. Similar to other 
defense programs, UAS development began in the spirit of cooperation. From 1988 to 1994, 
a newly established joint program office (JPO) oversaw all aspects of the DOD’s UAS 
programs.156 Despite the attempts at cooperation, not a single UAS achieved full production 
during the JPO’s administration.157 Responsibility for the acquisition and development of 
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UAS returned to the services in Fiscal Year 1998.158 This set the groundwork for inter-
service competition, but also innovation. The Navy pioneered the use of UAS in combat 
operations during Desert Storm. The aptly named Pioneer system deployed from battleships 
as an effective gunnery spotter for shore bombardment and was the first unmanned system 
to be surrendered to when an Iraqi unit waved white flags at the overflying drone.159 After 
Desert Storm, the Air Force quickly surpassed the other services—aided by budget 
increases—by integrating the Predator and Global Hawk in the conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan.160 In order to remain competitive, the Navy needed to develop ways to 
integrate unmanned systems in fleet doctrine.  
Despite an ingrained reluctance within naval aviation culture, there is a history of 
unmanned aircraft within the Navy. Specific to helicopters, the Navy developed the QH-50 
Drone Anti-submarine Helicopter (DASH) starting in 1958 through 1970, which even 
impacted ship design with the addition of aviation fuel tanks onboard non-carrier 
warships.161 The program was eventually abandoned due to technological limitations, 
serving as a case of failed innovation. More recently, the Navy has developed several 
unmanned platforms to compete in the UAS arena and increase its budget share. These 
include the MQ-25 Stingray, MQ-8B/C Fire Scout, and the MQ-4C Triton. The Navy plans 
to include five to eight fixed-wing Stingray in the carrier air wing as a tanker and ISR 
platform,162 taking up precious space and forcing helicopters from the carrier. The helicopter 
community attached itself to the rotary-wing Fire Scout and endeavored to adopt manned-
unmanned tactics, but the program continues to struggle with fleet integration.163 Not only 
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does the Fire Scout affect the manned helicopter budget but being connected to a struggling 
program has been detrimental the helicopter community’s bureaucratic influence. The larger, 
high-endurance, fixed-wing Triton is more of a threat to the future of the P-8A Poseidon and 
EP-3E Orion of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance community, but still represents an 
additional alternate pathway for the Navy’s resources to be diverted away from manned 
helicopters.  
Naval aviation has possessed a near monopoly in airborne mine warfare since its 
emergence, which limits innovation within MCM force, of which helicopters are a part. The 
helicopter proved its capability for mine detection during the Korean War,164 although this 
was limited to the naked eyesight of aircrew. In 1960, the Navy successfully demonstrated 
air-portable mine sweeping gear, making the helicopter a self-contained minesweeper.165 
Existing helicopters were converted to the airborne MCM role until the Navy established a 
dedicated HM squadrons—comprised of RH-53s—in 1971.166 Despite the addition of mine 
squadrons to the bureaucratic structure, within the Navy, mine warfare historically holds a 
subordinate role to all other warfare areas.167 With no competition from other services and 
the Navy’s complacent attitude toward mine threats, MCM ships and helicopters occupied 
an inferior position for funding. The impact on training, readiness, and morale emerged in 
the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm, where MCM ships and helicopters performed 
inadequately, resulting in damage to the USS Tripoli—ironically, the MCM helicopter 
carrier—and the USS Princeton as a result of Iraqi mines.168 This provided an impetus for 
the transition of the airborne MCM mission to the MH-60S and development of new MCM 
technology. However, while still under-going testing, the Navy stated in 2016 that this 
prospective configuration was not “operationally effective or suitable to conduct mine 
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countermeasure operations.”169 Without inter-service competition to drive innovation, this 
program risks being another failed innovation case for the Navy and its helicopter 
community. However, the increased emphasis placed on Chinese and Russia A2AD may 
have a positive effect and lead to increase funding for more effective technology and a more 
suitable aerial MCM platform.  
An alternate perspective within the inter-service model posits that increased jointness 
stifles innovation.170 Despite a history of inter-service competition, the Army and Navy have 
often shared rotary-wing platforms—to include the current H-60 fleet—with the Army as the 
lead and shouldering most of the research and development costs. The Army leads the 
development of the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program, which officially began in 2009 and 
is expected to field successors to current Army platforms in the early 2030s.171 These new 
aircraft will replace the full spectrum of the Army’s helicopter requirements, including 
manned assault and attack reconnaissance helicopters and tactical rotary-wing UAS.172 
Leveraging technology from the Army’s FVL efforts, the Navy plans to introduce the FVL-
MS program to replace the current MH-60R/S helicopters and MQ-8C by the mid-2030s.173 
The FVL-MS is expected to be a “family of manned and unmanned systems” aimed to 
address the capability gaps due to the emergency of peer adversaries and the capacity gaps 
faced by the upcoming retirement of aging platforms.174 It remains to be seen whether the 
Navy will develop an innovative and impactful platform unique to the maritime environment 
or if the FVL-MS be a less-capable compromise for the sake of jointness. 
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D. INTRA-SERVICE MODEL 
The intra-service model highlights the importance new theories of victory developed 
by senior services leaders and the competition between branches within that single service to 
fulfill the new theory. This section will address competition between the three primary 
unrestricted line branches of the Navy—aviation, surface, and submarines—but will 
primarily analyze the communities within the aviation branch. Historically, the preferred 
theory of victory for naval aviation is power projection and offensive strike operations 
delivered by carrier-based, fixed-wing fighters.175 However, space has been available for 
emerging technologies, missions, and subsequent force structure changes. This section will 
describe the effects of new theories of victory and bureaucratic dynamics (via analysis of 
promotion data) on the Navy helicopter community. 
The history of Navy helicopters is characterized by continuously evolving theories 
of victory. Helicopters gained a foothold within naval aviation when a small group of mid-
grade officers—led by the aforementioned LCDR Erickson—allied with the Commandant 
of the Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Russell Waesche, to advocate for the use of helicopter in 
ASW. After viewing an early helicopter demonstration, VADM Waesche convinced 
Admiral King, CinC, U.S. Fleet, of the viability of helicopters for military applications.176 
Admiral King directed the Navy’s BuAer to develop and evaluate helicopters for a role 
within the new theory of victory—ASW.177 In the early 1940s, a position within the 
bureaucracy was created by way of a helicopter class desk within BuAer, officially 
establishing the Navy helicopter community.178 
During the Cold War, a new theory of victory centered around nuclear war. Due to 
rotary-wing technology limitations and the Navy’s focus on developing other nuclear 
platforms, the helicopter community centered on ASW, logistics, and SAR in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II. However, new missions emerged for which helicopters were 
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uniquely suited, including MCM, NSW support, ASuW, and UAS integration. Each new 
mission represented a new theory of victory that resulted in the expansion of the helicopter 
community. In Korea, mine warfare emerged, for which new helicopter squadrons (HM) 
were created and new technology developed. During the Vietnam War, senior leaders 
recognized a need for aerial support of PBRs and SEALs. The Navy acquired helicopters 
from the Army and created a new squadron, the HAL-3 Seawolves, in 1967.179 Though the 
Seawolves were stood down in Vietnam, NSW support represented a new theory of victory 
and a mission that Navy helicopters continue today.  
The 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of the asymmetric threat against the 
Navy. At the time, the helicopter fleet focused on ASW, logistics, SAR, and MCM. The 
lessons learned from interaction with smaller Iraqi combatants during Desert Storm informed 
the expansion of ASuW to the aerial domain.180 The culmination occurred when Navy 
leaders established the HMP and Helo CONOPs 1.0 in 2001.181 The HMP and CONOPs 1.0 
provided for the acquisition of high-technology helicopters armed with machine guns, anti-
surface missiles, and rockets; and their implementation within Navy doctrine. Additionally, 
the Navy altered the force structure to reflect the newfound support for helicopters. The 
helicopter fleet was consolidated from seven to two aircraft and organized into two squadron 
types—sea combat (HSC) and maritime strike (HSM).182 Helicopter presence was also 
doubled within the carrier air wing, cementing a period of unprecedented growth for the 
helicopter community. 
The preceding examples of evolving theories of victory clearly facilitated the 
emergence of the helicopter within naval aviation. Recently, a new theory of victory emerged 
with a negative impact on helicopters: UAS. In an attempt to adapt, leaders within the 
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helicopter community latched on to the Fire Scout program, but the results have proved 
disappointing. A new squadron type was formed in 2012—Unmanned Helicopter 
Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (HUQ-1)183—and managed by the helicopter community 
but was decommissioned and downgraded to a maintenance detachment in less than two 
years.184 Despite continued bureaucratic and development setbacks, the Fire Scout remains 
integral to the helicopter community’s endeavors to adapt to the unmanned theory of victory.  
Unmanned systems also provide an arena for intra-service competition between the 
surface and aviation communities. In order to garner a larger budget share, the surface Navy 
is developing unmanned surface combatants to support the unmanned theory of victory.185 
Naval aviation’s reaction is the previously mentioned “CVW of the Future.” In 2019, due to 
impending budgetary decisions, senior aviation leaders directed the helicopter community to 
accelerate the analysis of planning for Helo CONOPs 2.0.186 While the concept is still under 
development and is undoubtedly an example of innovation, it is a reactionary consequence 
to the Navy’s preferences that—in the short term—physically removes helicopters from the 
carrier and air wing, reduces the role of helicopters within carrier aviation doctrine, and 
diminishes the bureaucratic influence of the helicopter community.  
The previous examples are illustrative of the Navy helicopter community as a 
continuously evolving and successful innovation case with respect to theories of victory, but 
it is necessary to look at the other side of the intra-service model—officer promotion—to 
explain its limited bureaucratic power. As discussed above, the force structure of the Navy 
and naval aviation has been changed several times to establish helicopter squadrons in 
support of new theories of victory. Bureaucratically, this establishes the helicopter 
community on par with the surface, submarine, and other aviation communities. However, 
empirical evidence found in higher-level promotions explains why helicopters hold an 
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inferior position within naval aviation and the larger Navy. Three primary communities 
comprise naval aviation (listed below):  
• Tactical air (TACAIR): F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-35 Lightning II, E-2D 
Hawkeye, EA-18G Growler. 
• Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces (MPRF): P-8A Poseidon, EP-
3E Orion, E-6B Mercury. 
• Helicopters and tiltrotor: MH-60R Seahawk, MH-60S Knighthawk, MH-
53E Sea Dragon, CMV-22B Osprey. 
Since World War II, the pinnacle of naval aviation—and the Navy, in general—has 
been the TACAIR community and—more specifically—carrier-based fighters. The 
remaining fixed-wing carrier aircraft fall beneath fighters. The land-based MPRF community 
comes after fixed-wing carrier aircraft. Literature summarizing the hierarchy either did not 
mention helicopters or insinuated a ranking at the bottom of the pecking order.187 
In line with the intra-service model, analysis of promotion data188 provides 
explanatory power for the dynamics between the communities within naval aviation. Up to 
and including O-5 squadron command, aviators are chosen and assigned to milestone billets 
within their respective communities.189 Aviation major command follows successful O-5 
command. Peak major command billets represent the first milestone in which officers from 
each aviation community compete against one another for promotion. Ranked in descending 
order from most prestigious to least is the command of aircraft carriers (CVNs), CVWs, big-
 
187 Builder, The Masks of War, p. 25. The author did not reference the Navy helicopter community 
but ranked carrier (TACAIR) and patrol (MPRF) aircraft; Jackson, et. al., Raising the Flag, 110. The 
authors mention officers from certain platforms (i.e., communities) rarely get picked for flag, alluding to 
the inferior bureaucratic position of the Navy helicopter community. 
188 Promotion data derived from current commanding and executive officers (CVN, LHA/D), current 
commanders and deputy commanders (CVW), Fiscal Year 2022 aviation major command screen board 
results (bases), and Fiscal Year 2021 PERS-43 aviation lists (flag). 
189 Jackson et al., Raising the Flag, 92–7. 
43 
deck amphibious ships (LHA/Ds), and shore bases.190 Subsequently, officers selected for 
CVN and CVW command are highly likely to promote to flag rank191 over the other major 
command billets. However, successful completion of any major command is a prerequisite 
for selection to flag rank.192 The breakdown of aviation major command and flag promotion 
by community is listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Promotion breakdown by naval aviation community 
 
 
This promotion data largely reflects the historical naval aviation hierarchy but does 
not reflect the current force structure. In terms of number of naval aviators, the helicopter 
community comprises 35 percent of naval aviation, followed by TACAIR at 34 percent. 
MPRF makes up the smallest portion at 31 percent.193 Helicopter pilots experience a 
relatively proportional promotion rate for major command, but the likelihood of promoting 
to flag rank is reduced. MPRF’s promotion rates are negatively disproportionate for both 
major command and flag. In contrast, TACAIR aviators experience disproportionately high 
rates of promotion to major command and even higher rates to flag rank. A simple 
explanation is found in the composition of the carrier air wing. The current CVW is 
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    y   y
Av Major Cmd1 CVN CVW LHA/D Base Flag2
TACAIR 59% 73% 94% 0% 25% 71%
MPRF 7% 0% 0% 0% 31% 10%
Helicopters 34% 27% 6% 100% 44% 19%
1 Aviation Major Command (AV Major Cmd) is O-6 command of CVNs, 
LHA/Ds, and bases.
2 Flag rank includes paygrades O-7 to O-10.
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comprised of six TACAIR squadrons (four of which are VFA), two helicopter squadrons, 
and a fleet logistics support (VRC) detachment. Mathematically, a TACAIR officer—
specifically, a VFA pilot—is more likely than a helicopter pilot to be selected for higher 
promotion. A nuanced explanation can be found in the Navy’s long-standing organizational 
preference for TACAIR over all other platforms, despite TACAIR’s reduced share of naval 
aviation compared to helicopters and MPRF. Promotion pathways to senior rank for 
TACAIR aviators have been established almost as long as naval aviation has existed. As the 
tendency is for “ducks to pick ducks,”194 TACAIR admirals continue to pick TACAIR 
aviators to promote to higher ranks with impunity. The Navy’s warfare branches possess a 
high degree of autonomy in promoting their own officers,195 allowing TACAIR’s 
bureaucratic power to dominate internal politics to an extent that is difficult for the other 
communities to challenge. The cycle continues as these senior TACAIR admirals perpetuate 
the theory of victory based on the aircraft carrier and carrier air wing. For helicopters, the 
reverse is true—lower selection for peak aviation major command jobs results in lower 
promotion to admiral. Less high-ranking helicopter pilots are then unable to influence the 
promotion of promising helicopter pilots or advocate for the community. The 
disproportionate promotion opportunity to flag ranks has cascading effects and provides an 
explanation for the legacy of limited bureaucratic influence and the current deemphasis of 
helicopters within the Navy. 
E. CULTURAL MODEL 
The helicopter’s role in U.S. Navy doctrine has been shaped by the Navy’s unique 
strategic and organizational culture. The Navy’s strategic culture values power projection 
through conventional offensive platforms—principally, aircraft carriers.196 
Organizationally, the Navy values independence, command at sea, and technical expertise 
for its unrestricted line officer corps.197 Within naval aviation, carrier-based fixed-wing 
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fighter pilots are the organizational preference,198 which aligns with the Navy’s strategic 
culture of strike and power projection. The realities of these dynamics have influenced the 
evolution of the Navy helicopter community. 
Helicopters influenced a paradigm shift within the Navy soon after being introduced 
to the fleet. After World War I, the U.S. Navy emerged as one of three major navies—along 
with the Royal Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy—to develop naval aviation.199 In the 
1920s, U.S. naval aviation was comprised of carrier-based aircraft, airships and dirigibles, 
land-based bombers, catapult seaplanes, and sea-based patrol planes.200 At the time, 
helicopters were in early stages of development and not considered to be of future military 
value. However, by late 1949, helicopters completely replaced the catapult-launched 
seaplanes on battleships and cruisers for utility missions, such as gunnery spotting, 
reconnaissance, and rescue.201 This evidence shows that the emergence of helicopters 
influenced a cultural shift, but the impact was minor in nature and failed to affect the greater 
cultural preferences of naval aviation and the Navy. 
When helicopters were introduced to the fleet in the mid-1940s, aircraft carriers and 
carrier-based aircraft were established as the Navy’s central battle force due to combat 
performance in World War II.202 The emergence of carrier aviation itself was compatible 
with the Navy’s strategic culture of offensive sea control and power projection that was 
previously filled by the battleship.203 In contrast, from inception, Navy leadership relied on 
civilian manufacturers to prove the usefulness of helicopters for military applications.204 As 
technological advancements made the helicopter a viable military option, the Navy’s 
ingrained culture—plus technology limitations compared to fixed-wing aircraft—shaped 
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how senior service leaders integrated helicopters within the Navy. Helicopters were used for 
defensive and supporting missions to protect ships and provide logistics for the fleet.205 
These auxiliary roles are incompatible with the culture of offensive action, providing an 
explanation for the limited influence of the helicopter community that endures today. 
A potential exception to the Navy’s cultural preference against helicopters is found 
with the introduction of the HMP and Helo CONOPs 1.0 that equipped helicopters with 
offensive weaponry in missiles, rockets, and machine guns. When introduced, senior Navy 
service leaders appeared to adapt the helicopter to fit within naval aviation’s strategic culture 
of offensive strike within the ASuW arena. The shift in favor of expanded helicopter 
capabilities was informed by the experience with smaller surface combatants in the Persian 
Gulf during Desert Storm,206 which can be seen as an external shock that forced the 
innovation. In theory, the addition of weapons and sensors positioned helicopters on par with 
other “first line combat aircraft.”207 However, once introduced to the fleet, helicopters fell 
back into their legacy defensive and supporting roles—albeit with considerably more 
firepower. Ingrained cultural preferences of ship and air wing commanders provide a 
potential explanation. In the years since Desert Storm, the asymmetric threat of small 
combatant ships largely disappeared, removing the external shock that served as the impetus 
for the increased presence of armed helicopters. With no real threats, the Navy’s cultural 
preferences and culture of autonomy for operational commanders squashed the attempt at 
innovation by senior Navy leaders.  
F. TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
Technology has both enabled and inhibited the expansion of the Navy’s helicopter 
community. Despite prevalent criticism of technology as a sole determinant of innovation, 
evidence shows that technology is inextricably linked to the helicopter case. Advancements 
in rotary-wing technology have failed to make demonstrable improvements in speed, 
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endurance, and payload, thereby inherently limiting capabilities—especially when compared 
to fixed-wing aircraft. These limited capabilities—combined with the Navy’s shaping of 
helicopter technology–have resulted in minimal strategic impact and bureaucratic influence. 
At first, the helicopter’s unique technological capabilities—hovering and slow 
flight— commanded new military applications and missions. As early as 1943, the helicopter 
proved the ability to operate from smaller areas than fixed-wing aircraft, leading to testing 
for shipboard applications.208 Suitability for non-carrier warships was quickly proven, 
opening a path for new helicopters missions, primarily ASW and rescue. Sensor technology 
caught up with and expanded mission effectiveness. A prime example is the addition of 
dipping sonar for submarine detection in 1945.209 Helicopters have also been armed with 
missiles, rockets, and machine guns, providing additional capabilities to expand missions 
sets. In theory, these weapons can be used in offensive roles, but are limited to action against 
small vessels. Compared to the Navy’s current premier strike platform—the F/A-18 Super 
Hornet—MH-60R/S helicopters carry approximately one-third the external payload but lack 
the advanced weapons to leverage that capacity at a comparable level to the Super Hornet.210 
The only ordnance carried by the MH-60R/S that could be considered a strike weapon for 
ASuW—the legacy AGM-114 Hellfire—has a small (18 pounds) warhead and short 
range211 for use against asymmetric surface combatants. The MH-60R/S is included in the 
DOD’s fielding of the new AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), but lethality is 
underwhelmingly reported as “at least equal to that of the Hellfire,”212 hardly proving a case 
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for innovation. In contrast, the Navy’s new Offensive ASuW (OASuW) strike weapon for 
the Super Hornet—the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Surface Missile (LRASM)—is an air-
launched cruise missile with a 1,000-pound warhead,213 a significant increase in stand-off 
firepower for future peer adversary conflict. The LRASM adds to the already considerable 
weapons loadout for the Super Hornet, which also includes air-to-air missiles and precision 
guided bombs. In comparison, the payload limitations prevent helicopters from truly 
fulfilling the Navy’s preferred offensive strike role. 
Additionally, the SST view asserts that helicopters are not affected by technological 
limitations, but by Navy leadership’s shaping of the helicopter technology within a certain 
role. Since inception, Navy leaders have viewed helicopters in defensive and supporting 
roles, further providing explanatory power for the lack of resources funneled to technological 
development of helicopters and helicopter-carried weapons. The inherent technological 
limitations are further limited by the Navy’s reluctance to truly develop platform and 
weapons technology to make helicopters an offensive contributor on par with fixed-wing 
aircraft.  
The Navy’s social shaping of UAS technology has secondary effects on the 
helicopter community. As unmanned technology underwrites the vision of future warfare for 
both civilian and service leaders alike, UAS are emerging to potentially supplant helicopters 
in traditional roles within the Navy. Leaders envision UAS as a more cost-effective and risk-
averse war of war that also overcomes the range and endurance limitations of manned 
platforms.214 Without substantial bureaucratic influence within naval aviation, the helicopter 
community struggles to counter the Navy’s SST dynamics. The Navy’s current UAS 
inventory—the aforementioned Stingray, Fire Scout, and Triton—primarily focus on aerial 
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refueling and ISR, but capabilities are being extended to core helicopter missions of ASW215 
and ASUW.216 This evidence suggests that advances in UAS technology—and the Navy’s 
shaping of the technology into traditional helicopter roles—contribute to the Navy’s 
deemphasis of the helicopter community and may lead to its ultimate demise. 
G. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, evidence shows that the standing of the Navy helicopter community is 
a result of the combination the five military innovation levels. While there is evidence of 
some civilian intervention over the course of the Navy’s history with helicopters, the level 
of direct influence over any phase is questionable. Any civilian intervention appears largely 
to reflect general opinion or reinforce the perspective of the senior service leaders. For 
example, President Roosevelt’s thoughts on including autogiros in convoys for ASW was 
made at about the same time that the group of mid-grade military officers were trying to 
convince senior officers of the viability of helicopters in that very role. There is no evidence 
to show that President Roosevelt’s thoughts influenced Admiral King—then the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet—to direct the development of helicopters for the ASW 
role. Since inception, the lack of civilian support for helicopters provides a possible 
explanation for their persistently limited role. Other platforms—aircraft carriers, fighters, 
UAS—simply garner more attention from civilian leaders.  
Evidence suggests that inter-service dynamics influences the Navy’s treatment of 
helicopters, but indirectly. Each DOD service employs helicopters in support roles—
reducing bureaucratic influence—and many helicopters have been developed jointly, 
limiting the chances for innovation. Throughout history, inter-service competition arises 
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from the quest for resources for marquee programs that have strategic impact. For the 
contemporary Navy, these programs include the Ford-class aircraft carrier, Columbia-class 
submarine, and several unmanned aerial, surface, and sub-surface systems. These programs 
garner the most attention from within and without the Navy, funneling resources—and 
opportunities for expansion and influence—away from the helicopter community.  
The strongest explanation appears to be in the Navy’s enduring theory of victory 
centered on power projection and offensive sea control and its effects on intra-service politics 
and culture. Although the new ASW theory of victory drove the introduction of helicopters 
immediately after World War II, the defensive nature of the role limited the influence of the 
helicopter community, a reality that continues today. In contrast, the TACAIR community 
embodies the power projection mission, giving it undeniably superior bureaucratic power 
within the Navy at large, and specifically above the helicopter and MPRF communities 
within naval aviation. As a result, officers of the strike-fighter community are promoted at 
greater rates and comprise a significant portion of prestigious command billets and flag 
ranks. With the prevalence and power of these officers, the culture supporting the preference 
of carrier-based, fixed-wing, offensive operations perpetuates at the expense of others. 
Inherent technological limitations underwrite the helicopters inability to fulfill the Navy’s 
offensive strike and power projection roles, further confirming cultural bias against the 
helicopter community and limiting its influence within the Navy and naval aviation. 
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IV. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IMPLICATIONS 
The U.S. Navy’s commitment to helicopters spans over 70 years. In the face of 
unprecedented expansion of the helicopter community in the first two decades of the 21st 
century, the Navy seems to be reversing its investment. What explains the Navy’s apparent 
deemphasis of helicopters despite a long-proven record of supporting naval strategy and 
doctrine? This thesis attempts to answer the question by analyzing the Navy’s historical 
and current treatment of the helicopter community through five models of military 
innovation studies—civil-military, inter-service, intra-service, cultural, and technology—
and to determine which model provides the best explanation. 
Ultimately, this thesis finds that no single model provides a sufficient explanation 
for the Navy’s apparent deemphasis of helicopters. However, analysis of the empirical 
evidence shows that the best explanatory power is found in the dynamic interaction of the 
models. The Navy’s treatment of helicopters evolved throughout the platform’s history as 
aspects of each model waxed and waned and, thus, provided both beneficial and 
unfavorable different outcomes. Fluctuations in the influence of different aspects of each 
models explain the varying levels of importance applied by the Navy to helicopters. This 
chapter provides a detailed review of the findings for each hypothesis, outlines policy 
recommendations for the Navy, and presents potential future contributions to the field of 
military innovation studies. 
1. Civil-Military Model (H1) 
The civil-military model posits that military innovation occurs when civilian 
leaders’ interpretation of the geopolitical environment drives an intervention in military 
policy.217 The hypothesis based on this model asserts that civilian intervention in Navy 
policy caused the Navy to deemphasize the role of the helicopter community. Empirical 
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evidence suggests minimal civilian intervention in favor of helicopters, attributing less 
explanatory power to this hypothesis. However, a modification of the hypothesis appears 
to be valid.  
A stronger explanation is found in a distinct lack of support for the helicopter 
community due to civilian intervention for other Navy programs, typified by current 
backing for the “CVW of the Future.” The concept is an example of innovation based 
advanced aviation platforms—the F-35 Lightning II, CMV-22B Osprey, and MQ-25 
Stingray—against which the helicopter community was unable to counter due to a lack of 
civilian intervention. The effect for helicopters appears to be less budget share, reduced 
influence, and diminished physical presence on aircraft carriers, the center of naval 
aviation.  
2. Inter-service Model (H2) 
In this model, military service organizations within a state compete for budget share 
in a zero-sum game, resulting in innovation.218 The inter-service hypothesis argues that 
the competition for resources between the services within the DOD caused the Navy to 
deemphasize the helicopter community. Throughout history, helicopters have proved to be 
a source of jointness, specifically between the Navy and Army. Since World War II, inter-
service competition positively affected the helicopter community—refuting the 
hypothesis—as the Navy funneled resources for ASW helicopters. First to fight the German 
U-boats and then to counter Soviet submarines, the Navy continuously developed 
technology and doctrine for helicopters to provide aerial ASW in concert with surface 
ships, a main-stay helicopter mission to this day.  
More recently, empirical evidence provides validity for the hypothesis in the form 
of UAS. The Navy currently invests in several forms of UAS—the Stingray, Fire Scout, 
Triton—as unmanned platforms become more central the American way of war. Resources 
that could be funneled to the helicopter community are instead given to Navy UAS 
programs, thus validating this hypothesis.  
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3. Intra-service Model (H3) 
The intra-service model asserts that innovation emerges when a new community 
within a military service embraces new capabilities in a challenge against an established 
community.219 The new community embraces a new theory of victory based on the 
capabilities. The innovation cycle is completed when the new community usurps influence 
and control over officer promotions.220 The hypothesis based on this model contests that 
the Navy deemphasized the helicopter community as a result of the development of a new 
theory of victory by senior Navy leaders and subsequent bureaucratic structure. 
Historically, Navy helicopters benefited from a new theory of victory. Empirical evidence 
shows that helicopters were initially brought into service to conduct ASW for trans-
Atlantic convoys during World War II and continued ASW mission throughout the Cold 
War. A corresponding bureaucratic structure was created throughout the period, bringing 
helicopters pilots on par with other aviation and Navy communities—on paper at least. 
Another example that benefited helicopters—but refutes the hypothesis—was the 
development of the HMP and Helo CONOPs 1.0 in 2001, which played to helicopters 
capabilities, expanded presence within the carrier air wing, and paved a path for increased 
bureaucratic influence.  
The trend in favor of the helicopter community appears to be reversing. Recent 
evidence validates the hypothesis as the Navy has transitioned its focus from asymmetric 
warfare—a wheelhouse for Navy helicopters—to an era of great power competition. The 
pivot emphasizes other strategies, concepts, and platforms (i.e., theories of victory) that 
nullify the swell of influence from the early 2000s and diminishes the role of helicopters 
under the new theory of victory. As a recent development, the effect on promotion for 
helicopters pilots remains to be seen. It is doubtful that the helicopter community’s still-
under-development response to the current situation—Helo CONOPs 2.0—will garner 
significant change in the current dynamic. 
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4. Cultural Model (H4) 
In this model, a military organization’s unique culture explains why and how 
innovation occurs.221 The cultural hypothesis argues that the Navy’s unique strategic and 
organizational culture caused the deemphasis of the helicopter community. Empirical 
evidence presents strong support for this hypothesis over the course of history of Navy 
helicopters. In a culture typified by fixed-wing, offensive strike launched from aircraft 
carriers, the defensive-oriented helicopters—that largely do not deploy from carriers—
prove incompatible with naval aviation culture. Despite being outfitted with more 
armament in recent decades, the weaponry is employed in a defensive role, which has not 
allowed for a breakthrough to greater cultural acceptance.  
5. Technology Model (H5) 
The technology model asserts that changes in technology determine how military 
organizations innovate and, thus, how wars are fought.222 The hypothesis based on this 
model contests that inherent technological limitations—combined with advancements in 
other platforms—caused the Navy to deemphasize helicopters. Empirical evidence lends 
strong explanatory power to this hypothesis. Since the early Navy helicopters, 
manufacturers have struggled to increase speed, range, and weapons payload at the same 
rate as developments in fixed-wing aircraft. While the ability to hover and fly at slow 
speeds is beneficial for some mission sets—ASW, SAR, NSW support—evolving concepts 
of warfare require increased firepower carried by helicopters. The current inventory of 
Navy helicopters is capable of carrying missiles, rockets, machine guns, and rockets, but 
the amount of ordnance and the range at which the ordnance can be employed is 
insignificant compared to the Navy’s fixed-wing aircraft. As a result—and with some 
influence from the culture model—limited technological capabilities have kept Navy 
helicopters in defensive and supporting roles. 
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This hypothesis is further supported by recent technological advancements in other 
aviation programs. Manned aircraft—including the F-35 and Osprey—prove more capable 
of conducting missions in the Navy’s preferred methods. Unmanned aircraft—Stingray, 
Fire Scout, and Triton—increasingly infringe on traditional helicopter missions at a 
cheaper bottom line with less risk to human life. These programs gain additional resources 
to further improve the technology, while the future Navy helicopter remains in conceptual 
development.  
6. Alternate Hypothesis: The Dynamic Interaction of Models 
The dynamics of each model are present in this case study, but individually do not 
provide a sufficient explanation for the Navy’s deemphasis of a community that has existed 
for over eighty years and represents a current plurality of naval aviation. Analysis of the 
empirical evidence provides an alternate hypothesis—the dynamic interaction between the 
military innovation models caused the Navy to deemphasize the helicopter community. 
There is precedent for this hypothesis. Griffin asserts that while each military innovation 
model can provide a specialized explanation for a given case, the best explanatory is often 
found in a synthesis of the models due to their mutual compatibility.223 During World War 
II, the dynamics of the models fused, leading to the establishment of helicopters within the 
Navy. Since, fluctuating dynamics have both benefited and disadvantaged the helicopter 
community, enabling the helicopter community to remain relevant, both bureaucratically 
and in the warfighting realm.  
The alternate hypothesis provides the strongest explanation for the current 
deemphasis of the helicopter community by the Navy. Helicopter technology has not 
developed sufficiently to allow it to emerge into an offensive strike platform. This—
combined with the Navy’s preference to relegate helicopters to defensive and supporting 
roles—prevents the community from truly embodying the culture of naval aviation. 
Because they are culturally incompatible, helicopter pilots face institutional inertia against 
promotion to higher ranks and positions. As a result, the helicopter community lacks 
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advocates in senior ranks, which restrains bureaucratic influence and power within the 
Navy. Less power and influence leads to the helicopter community losing the intra-service 
competition for resources, personnel, and relevance—completing the loop that keeps 
helicopters in a diminished position. Finally, there is no evidence of civilian intervention 
to counter Navy leadership and save the helicopter community from its apparent demise.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The field of military innovations studies aims to provide pragmatic research and 
analysis to aid practitioners in formulating policy and strategy.224 In that spirit, this 
section’s purpose is to provide several recommendations for Navy policy toward 
helicopters. Force structure recommendations are geared towards maintaining bureaucratic 
influence through effective reorganization as the helicopter community adapts to recent 
Navy decisions that disadvantage helicopters. However, it is also important to emphasize 
that the helicopter community must maintain the competencies in asymmetric warfare that 
have been learned since the Gulf War. Similar to the Cold War—where the threat of nuclear 
escalation actually led to lower-intensity conflicts—the GPC era may be characterized by 
asymmetric tactics (i.e., swarming by small boats) against U.S. carriers and other 
warships—instead of attacks by the feared “carrier killer” missiles. The helicopter may 
come back into vogue for defense of capital ships and must maintain the organizational 
knowledge for this eventuality. Nevertheless, the focus of these conceptual 
recommendations is helicopter support for the fleet concept of DMO under the current 
Navy policy towards helicopters.  
1. Force Structure 
a. Realignment of Sea Combat (HSC) Squadrons 
The “CVW of the Future” reduces the number of helicopters by three MH-60S 
(HSC squadron) and one MH-60R (HSM squadron). Despite a 30 percent reduction in 
helicopters, the rank structure of the HSC squadrons remains largely the same. In effect, 
an O-5 carrier-based HSC squadron commanding officer—supported by another O-5 
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executive officer— is doing the same job as an O-4 amphibious-ship-based HSC 
detachment officer-in-charge (OIC), as both are responsible for three aircraft and 
associated personnel. Eventually, the larger Navy will recognize the cost differences and 
force a transition on the helicopter community. Instead, helicopter community leaders 
should lead a reorganization. The number of carrier-based HSC squadrons should be 
reduced and adjusted to mirror the construct of expeditionary HSC squadrons, which sends 
detachments of one to three aircraft to sea under the responsibility of an O-4 OIC. An HSC 
detachment would then deploy as part of the air wing—similar to the current VRC 
detachments of C-2A Greyhound aircraft—or become an auxiliary to the HSM squadron 
that remains largely intact on the carrier, reporting to the HSM commanding officer—who 
then reports to the air wing commander (CAG). This composite carrier-based helicopter 
squadron concept of the ASW MH-60R and utilitarian MH-60S mirrors the pre-Helo 
CONOPs 1.0 air wing HS squadron, which was comprised primarily of ASW helicopters 
and several utility helicopters for SAR and logistics. The decommissioned carrier-based 
HSC squadrons will be available to transition to rotary-wing UAS (HUQ) squadrons and 
personnel available for a similar transition or to fill the ranks of proposed NSW squadrons 
(discussed below). Not only does this realignment create a cost-effective solution for the 
helicopter community, but also provides alternate pathways for helicopters pilots to pursue 
while remaining under the umbrella of the Navy helicopter community. 
b. Reinstatement of Rotary-Wing UAS Squadrons 
To remain relevant in the intra-service competition for resources and bureaucratic 
influence, the helicopter community must re-establish dedicated rotary-wing UAS 
squadrons. In 2012, HUQ-1 was the first U.S. Navy UAS squadron to be established but 
was decommissioned within two years. The Navy recently showed a regained appetite for 
dedicated UAS squadrons by standing up an unmanned carrier launched multi-role 
squadron (VUQ-10) to operate the MQ-25 Stingray, in addition to an unmanned patrol 
squadron (VUP-19) that has been established since 2013.225 Compared to shore-based 
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VUP and carrier-based VUQ, rotary-wing UAS squadrons and their detachments face 
physical limitations. The smaller warships—primarily LCS—on which they deploy simply 
lack the space—for both personnel and aircraft—to support a dedicated UAS detachment 
in addition to a helicopter detachment. While the reasoning was never released, this may 
explain why HUQ-1 was disestablished almost as soon as it was created. Regardless, in an 
environment that prioritizes unmanned systems and will for the foreseeable future, the 
helicopter community must push to create a rotary-wing UAS fleet replacement squadron 
(FRS), at a minimum.  
An example is found in the new HUQ iteration assuming the lineage of the most 
recently decommissioned HSC squadron—HSC-15—and renaming the squadron HUQ-
15. This squadron will administratively fall under the HSC type wing—HSC Wing 
Pacific—as HUQ-1 did. Not only does this preserve the heritage and tradition of helicopter 
squadrons but positions the helicopter community to command influence over rotary-wing 
UAS and brings it on par with other aviation communities embracing UAS squadrons. As 
leaders find a solution to space issues or deployments extend to larger warships, precedent 
is set for future operational HUQ squadrons to assume the lineage of carrier-based HSC 
squadrons that may decommission in the coming years due to the emergence of the “CVW 
of the Future.” 
c. Expansion and Reinvestment in NSW Support Squadrons 
Despite the increased importance placed on Navy SEALs during the GWOT era, 
the Navy currently only has a single helicopter squadron dedicated to NSW support—and 
a reserve squadron at that. Additionally, that squadron—HSC-85—has been on the 
budgetary chopping block every year since 2016.226 Traditional active HSC squadrons 
provide NSW support, but those missions are largely conducted in training or during non-
combat exercises. First, the Navy should transition the reserve HSC-85 to a fully active 
unit and recommission HSC-84 similarly. The “extra” MH-60S helicopters released from 
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the carrier in the “CVW of the Future”—not used for DMO (outlined below)—can be 
repurposed to both squadrons. Qualified pilots and aircrewmen would transition and train 
specifically for NSW support, closing the gap with Army and Air Force aviation units that 
typically operate with Navy SEALs. Additionally, both squadrons should also be re-
envisioned as composite helicopter-tiltrotor units. As the Navy acquires more Ospreys, the 
aircraft should be made available to the NSW squadrons. Ospreys have a longer range and 
increased payload compared to the MH-60S, expanding the capabilities of the squadrons. 
Ultimately, increased aviation NSW capabilities of a composite HSC and fleet logistics 
multi-mission squadron (VRM) may garner a larger interservice budget share as special 
operations forces (SOF) missions are increasingly used as an instrument of national power. 
2. Concepts 
a. Helicopter Support for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) 
DMO is a concept that emerged from the surface Navy, which aviation has yet to 
fully support. This provides ample opportunity for the helicopter community to leverage 
the “extra” aircraft that will be removed from the carrier to lead naval aviation’s backing 
for DMO. Three MH-60S and one MH-60R helicopters will be removed from each new 
air wing, theoretically making 36 aircraft available.227 The inherent flexibility of 
helicopters allows deployment to small warships, large carriers, and shore-based facilities. 
This permits Navy leaders to position helicopters armed for ASW and ASuW at geographic 
choke points and almost any type of Navy warship, thus distributing aerial firepower. If 
the helicopter types are deployed in tandem, a return to the hunter-killer concept of Helo 
CONOPs 1.0 provides an opportunity for armed helicopter crews to prove the capabilities 
of the helicopter community. Support for a fleet concept—potentially reinforced through 
operational success—would garner attention at high levels, leading to increased 
bureaucratic influence and better positioning in the competition for resources. 
F-35s and H-60s: The “Lightning Air Wing” 
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A proposed “Lightning Air Wing” continues the theme of helicopter—and naval 
aviation’s—support for DMO. Much has been written in recent years about “Lightning 
Carriers,” a concept in which large amphibious ships (LHA/D) deploy with a full 
contingent of Marine F-35B Lightning II short takeoff and landing (STOVL) aircraft in 
lieu of the traditional Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) aviation combat element 
(ACE).228 The ACE—sometimes referred to as the Marine air wing—is typically 
comprised of approximately 28 to 30 jets, tiltrotors, and helicopters in support of the 
MEU’s ground combat element (GCE).229 As the Marine Corps transitions from land-
based operations to focus on the maritime domain in the era of GPC, this concept provides 
the Navy with an alternate source of flexible aerial firepower that does not rely on the 
current fleet of Navy aircraft carriers. 
The proposed “Lightning Air Wing” is complementary to the “Lightning Carrier” 
concept and provides an opportunity for the helicopter community to support DMO. This 
new air wing would embark on LHA/D ships and notionally consist of 16 to 20 F-35Bs—
split between two Navy (VFA) or Marine (VMFA) fighter-attack squadrons—and two six 
to eight helicopters—split into two detachments of HSC’s MH-60S and HSM’s MH-60R. 
The Navy helicopters leverage the hunter-killer concept to gain sea control, from which 
the F-35s project power against a near-peer adversary. Expansion of the concept disperses 
additional Navy helicopters to the smaller combatants accompanying the LHA/D within 
the expeditionary strike group (ESG) and brings the detachments to squadron strength 
(providing additional command opportunities and influence within the air wing for 
helicopter pilots). An addition of a yet-to-be developed STOVL UAS provides airborne 
early warning (AEW) and a detachment of Ospreys supports the ESG with over-the-
horizon logistics. These additions bring the capabilities of the “Lighting Air Wing” on par 
with the traditional CVW, but on a smaller scale. This smaller scale—that still packs 
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considerable firepower—falls directly in line with DMO and provides commanders with 
an unprecedented flexibility while also reducing vulnerability—and cost. 
The proof of concept will include Marine Corps F-35s with Marine aviators and 
Navy exchange pilots but can transition to a full Navy concept—comprised entirely of 
Navy F-35s and pilots—if validated. However, an all-Navy “Lightning Air Wing” may be 
out of reach due to the lack of Navy investment in the STOVL F-35 variant, but the concept 
can be impactful to DMO as a blue-green team of Navy helicopters and Marine F-35s. The 
inclusion of helicopters also provides further opportunities to prove capabilities and new 
unique pathways for helicopter pilots to promote to influential operational command 
positions.  
b. NSW Support: Naval Aviation for Navy SEALs 
After almost twenty years of combat in land-locked conflict zones, the Navy SEALs 
have refocused efforts to the maritime environment. The return to sea presents difficulties 
for the Army and Air Force aviation platforms that primarily carried SEALs into combat 
during the period. In 2013, Lieutenant General Eric Fiel, USAF, commander of Air Force 
Special Operations Command, stated that “the vast expanses of the Pacific area a concern 
for those tasked with getting SEALs and other commandos where they need to be.”230 A 
Navy solution is found in naval aviation supporting SEALs from newly commissioned 
expeditionary sea base (ESB) ships.231 ESB ships are optimized for SOF missions and 
contain a large flight deck and considerable aviation facilities.232 The aforementioned 
HSC/VRM squadrons could embark the ESB with a SEAL contingent. Navy MH-60S 
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helicopters provide a medium-lift capability or can be armed to escort the larger capacity 
CMV-22B Ospreys. Navy pilots accustomed to operating at sea provide a specialized 
capability to support the SEALs as they return to the maritime environment. The range of 
the Ospreys extends the reach for potential overland missions. The mobility and flexibility 
of the ESB allows on-demand NSW missions for combatant commanders. As the concept 
grows and additional ESB ships are commissioned, naval aviation will have a significant 
impact on global operations, marking a larger-scaled return to the legacy of the Seawolves 
of Vietnam.  
C. MILITARY INNOVATION STUDIES: FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES  
This thesis both advances the field of military innovation studies and highlights 
opportunities for further research. In line with recent trends in the field, this thesis confirms 
that the dynamic combination of the models provides greater explanatory power than each 
model individually.233 Additionally, Navy helicopters have largely been omitted from 
historical accounts of naval aviation and lack the contemporary coverage of other 
platforms. This case study brought the platform to the forefront and potentially increased 
the visibility of a community that has grown from a late starter in the early aviation years 
to gaining the plurality of naval aviation as of 2020. Explanations garnered by this thesis 
may influence naval aviation and helicopter leaders to avoid the perceived demise of the 
community or—in the least—help guide the transition to other platforms and capabilities. 
This thesis provides significant opportunities for further research in the field of 
military innovation studies. Specifically, an all-encompassing military innovation case 
study of U.S. naval aviation would offer an unprecedented perspective on the world’s 
leading military aviation organization. While TACAIR historically garners the most 
attention, an analysis of the community through the lens of military innovation sheds new 
light on the community’s unprecedented and pervasive position at the top of the naval 
aviation hierarchy. Similar to helicopters, the MPRF community has a long history of Navy 
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service but has not received the field’s attention. This thesis humbly presents some insights 
or—minimally—provides resources for the helicopter portion of the study.  
The research is even more important as the Navy’s warfighting focus continues to 
transition towards unmanned platforms, resulting in bureaucratic structures that have 
already established a fledgling Navy UAS community. In 2015, Secretary of the Navy Ray 
Mabus asserted that the F-35C “should be, and almost certainly will be, the last manned 
strike fighter aircraft the Department of the Navy will ever buy or fly.”234 This statement 
begs several questions that the field of military innovation studies can endeavor to explain. 
How does U.S. naval aviation ensure its survival as UAS replace manned aircraft? When 
do the fighter pilots relinquish superior bureaucratic power to UAS operators within naval 
aviation and the other officer communities within the larger Navy? Does naval aviation get 
absorbed into the surface fleet? Will the aircraft carrier finally lose its primacy? Further 
research is required to discover the answers. 
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